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NOTES
Water Management on the
Brahmaputra and the
Applicability of the UNECE Water
Convention
ABSTRACT

The Brahmaputra River is one of the world's largest
transboundarywaterways, yet it lacks a coherent, international
management framework. The river, which flows from China
through India and into Bangladesh, has been subject to decades
of stalled negotiations, gamesmanship, and stop-gap oversight
measures. As climate change and population growth place new
stressors on the Brahmaputra and its riparian states, this
arrangement will become untenable. Moreover, obtaining
consensus may soon become impossible as the region grows
increasinglywater scarce. There is a brief window of opportunity
to rectify inadequate management of the river and address urgent
issues such as environmental protection and apportionment of
the water's resources. The recent opening of the UNECE Water
Convention to non-European signatoriesprovides a mechanism
to do so: The Convention's adherence to common international
law water principles, its incremental approach to collaboration,
and its focus on environmental stewardship and scientific data
sharing provide an ideal model to initiate multilateral
cooperation between the Brahmaputra riparian states. Strong
multilateralfoundations should be established before the region
is confronted by a changingphysical landscapecaused by climate
change; the UNECE Water Convention provides such a structure
and should be utilized.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Brahmaputra River' is a major waterway in Central and
South Asia. Its basin covers an expanse of 223,939 square miles, about
the size of Arizona and Nevada combined, and its waters provide
2
resources for China, India, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. The river
originates in the Chemayundung Glacier, traverses 1,800 miles of
Tibet, India, and Bangladesh, and coalesces into the Ganges3
Brahmaputra Delta, which discharges into the Bay of Bengal.
The Brahmaputra is the fifth largest river in the world, by flow,
and at 1.84 billion tons per year, the Ganges-Brahmaputra system has

The Brahmaputra River is also known as the 'Yaluzangbu' in China and the
1.
'Jamuna'in Bangladesh. In this Note, I refer to the system as a whole as "Brahmaputra."
Nilanthi Samaranayake et al., Water Resource Competition in the
2.
BrahmaputraRiver Basin: China, India, and Bangladesh, CNA, May 2016, at 3.
From the Himalayas, the river runs east for 700 miles between the Great
3.
Himalayas range and the Kailas Range, combining with several tributaries along the
way. After turning north and running through a series of rapids and cascades, the river
begins its southern descent across the eastern edge of the Himalayas and enters into the
Arunachal Pradesh state in northeastern India. The river widens in India, gaining more
water from tributaries to make a braided path for 450 miles through the Indian state of
Assam before entering Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra coalesces with
several other rivers in the region to create the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta before
discharging into the Bay of Bengal. Nafis Ahmad & Deryck 0. Lodrick, Brahmaputra
https://www.britannica.comlplace/
(2017),
BRITANNICA
ENCYCLOPEDIA
River,
Brahmaputra-River [https://perma.cc/73JB-ESJD] (archived Jan. 28, 2018).
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the largest combined suspended sediment load in the world.4 The river
system experiences massive flooding in the north due to summertime
glacial discharges, while summer monsoons also prompt heavy flooding
in the lowlands.5 River embankments, which are meant to provide flood
protection, are often inadequate and can exacerbate flood damage. 6
Every year, these floods destroy life, property, and valuable farmland.7
Deforestation has also led to increased landslides and erosion, which
adds to the river's sediment load and increases the ferocity of its
floods. 8 An estimated 64,000 people in Bangladesh alone are displaced
yearly as a result of riverbank erosion.9 Despite these environmental
challenges, millions of people, most notably in Bangladesh, rely on the
water's resources for fishing, farming, and commercial transportation.
Yet unlike the other major waterways of the world, there is no
comprehensive water agreement managing the basin.' 0
The last century of diplomatic maneuvering over the
Brahmaputra has primarily occurred through bilateral diplomacy, a
mechanism ill-suited to handle a river that flows through multiple
states. Although Bangladesh, the country most dependent on the
river's physical upkeep, has repeatedly tried to negotiate agreements
with the upper riparian states, neither China nor India has made a
sustained effort to work towards a long-term apportionment of the
river's resources, or a framework for coordinating its well-being.
Climate change is likely to add significant stressors to these riparian
states generally, but also to the regions around the Brahmaputra
specifically: the river is forecasted to experience more frequent and
longer-lasting floods, a problem exacerbated by inadequate river

4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
For instance, many of the embankments in the Indian state of Assam, built
since 1954, have reported lifespans of 25-30 years, and are showing signs of ageing.
Erosion, rat tunnels, and the use of these embankments as highways by many of the
local residents are contributing to their destruction. See Samudra Gupta Kashyap, Flood
Fury: Why the Brahmaputra's Trail of Destruction Has Become an Annual Ritual in
Assam, INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 7, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://indianexpress.com/
article/indialindia-news-indialflood-fury-why-brahmapurtas-trail-of-destruction-hasbecome-annual-ritual-in-assam-2958587/ [https://perma.cc/JL28-ZLHV] (archived Jan.
20, 2018).
7.
In the Indian state of Assam alone, Brahmaputra flooding in 2014 claimed 68
lives, destroyed 54,000 homes, and rendered useless 372,000 hectares of crops; 40
embankments were breached during this period. See id.
Id.
8.
9.
The
Game
of
the
River,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
19,
2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601053-last-bangladesh-starts-tame-mightybrahmaputra-game-river [https://perma.cc/JL28-ZLHV] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
10.
Sriyanie Miththapala, Integrating Environmental Safeguards into Disaster
Management: A Field Manual Volume I: Reference Material 48 (Ecosystems and
Livelihoods Group Asia, IUCN 2008), https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/
files/documents/2008-058-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CS5-YR43] (archived Jan. 21, 2018;
Bangladesh, UN
DATA
(2017),
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName
=bangladesh#Economic [https://perma.cc/7Y42-CUDK] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
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infrastructure and a growing population that is increasingly settling
in flood-prone land."
This Note argues that a robust multilateral agreement should be
implemented to protect each riparian state's interests in the river and
to protect the physical well-being of the Brahmaputra's waters while
the window for cooperation still exists. Part II provides background on
the Brahmaputra in both physical and political terms, and discusses
international water law applicable to the river system. Part III
describes and analyzes the relationships between each riparian state
to provide the context necessary to understand how a multilateral
agreement might be reached. Part IV introduces the UNECE Water
Convention's incremental approach to cooperation and its principles of
transparency, reciprocity, and prevention of significant harm, and
suggests this language provides a suitable framework on which to build
a Brahmaputra River system agreement. Finally, Part V concludes
that the UNECE Water Convention will adequately address each
riparian state's current concerns while simultaneously preparing the
region to adapt with a changing water landscape.

Brian Orland, A Volatile BrahmaputraRiver Will Grow Only More So, N.Y.
11.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013 1:13 AM), https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/climatechange-will-make-a-volatile-brahmaputra-river-even-more-so/?_r= 1
[https://perma.cclFYD8-7WU7] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
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riparian state, with initial control over the river and its tributaries, to
exert political pressure not only in response to conflicts between the
two states, but also to signal broader Chinese displeasure at Indian
foreign policy. For example, China blocked a tributary to the
Brahmaputra River following antagonistic border actions India took in
2016 towards its neighbor Pakistan.' 5 Border conflicts between India,
China, and Pakistan show no sign of abating, despite eighteen recent
rounds of border talks held between China and India; therefore, the
6
river could be used offensively again in the future.' In this volatile
region, the river is but one factor within a larger battle for territorial
control.
The tensions between China and India over land ownership also
stretch into river use, namely through the construction of hydroelectric
dams. Domestically, China views the Brahmaputra as an opportune
source of hydroelectric power: to date, China has built one dam on the
river and has plans for the development of several more.1
India's regional concerns center around the physical and political
power that China wields as the upper riparian state. Politically, India
is concerned that China's dam building and potential water diversion
projects could damage the river water flow that India relies upon. India
seeks to establish user rights to the river, including through the
construction of its own dams, to mitigate these concerns and to deter
8
the perceived Chinese encroachment on the Arunachal Pradesh.'
Domestically, India seeks to harness the Brahmaputra for
hydroelectricity, as well as to manage flood control, with plans to build
9
more than 168 dams on the Brahmaputra and its tributaries.'
The gamesmanship between India and China particularly
troubles Bangladesh, the final state through which the Brahmaputra
runs before discharging into the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh relies most
heavily on the river and its resulting delta for the livelihood of its
citizens. Bangladesh, therefore, is most concerned with the river's

Vishnupriya Bhandaram, Why China's Move to Block Brahmaputra
15.
Tributary is Actually Linked to Balochistan, FIRSTPOST (Oct. 4, 2016, 13:09 IST),
http://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-move-to-block-brahmaputra-tributary-isactually-linked-to-balochistan-3033524.html [https:/perma.cc/NPJ2-HLJM] (archived
Jan. 21, 2018).
PTI New Delhi, India, China hold the 181h Round of Border Talks,
16.
HINDUSTAN TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015, 14:14 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/
india-china-hold-the- 18th-round-of-border-talks/story-yawLgrUbr9djpzkUkyTIKP.html
[https://perma.cc/3MKJ-DPFN] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
The future dam building projects include on rivers that are tributaries to
17.
the Brahmaputra. See Neeta Lal, India and China in a Water War, ASIA SENTINEL (Aug.
31, 2017), https://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/india-china-water-war/ [https://perma..
cc/7937-YCDV] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at iv.
18.
19.
Id.; Samrat, Unbraiding the Brahmaputra, HINDU (July 2, 2017 3:45 IST),
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/unbraiding-thebrahmaputra/articlel9l97118.ece [https://perma.cc/38JF-ELX6] (archived Jan. 21,
2018).
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physical well-being, in terms of both the quality and quantity of the
water that reaches its borders. 20 In particular, Bangladesh fears any
potential water diversions and poor river management from its upper
riparian neighbors. In other words, Bangladesh's perspective is less
political than practical: its citizens rely on the physical presence and
cleanliness of the river, and its leaders cannot afford to have other
powers using the river as a bargaining chip or as a way to ease their
broader water concerns.
The problems between Bangladesh and India follow traditional
trends of conflict between upper and lower riparian states, namely that
India will use the river for its own devices, both politically and
economically, with little regard for Bangladesh's priorities.2 1
Bangladesh fears that India will divert water for irrigation and water
supply interests, negatively affecting the river's flow, which is heavily
relied upon by Bangladesh in its downstream agricultural uses. 22 The
Brahmaputra accounts for 65 percent of Bangladesh's river water, and
the delta it forms with the Ganges and Meghna rivers constitutes the
base of the Bangladeshi agricultural sector, accounting for almost half
of employment in the area.2 3
Beyond the somewhat strained Bangladeshi-Indian relationship
over the physical upkeep of the river system, the political tensions at
the river's headwaters between China and India leave Bangladesh
even more concerned about the well-being of the river and the
livelihoods of its citizens who depend on the water. Bangladesh
remains particularly vulnerable to any actions China or India might
take to alter the water's flow. The state faces problems within its own
borders related to riverbank erosion, salinization, floods, diminished
water flow, and dwindling groundwater resources.24 The combination
of a changing environment, mismanagement of the water, and
upstream pollution could severely affect the agricultural lifestyle
depended upon by so many living within the water basin.
'The physical upkeep of the Brahmaputra water system faces
several threats in the upcoming decades due to political
mismanagement and a changing natural environment. First, the
Brahmaputra
faces
severe
envirohmental
threats
due to

20.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at iii.
21.
The international community has in the past few decades recognized the
principle of equitable and reasonable use of shared water resources as part of
international water law, even as some states resist the codification of this principle as
part of customary international law. See Ziyi Huang, Case Study on the Water
Management of the Yaluzangbu/BrahmaputraRiver, 27 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 229,
235 (2015).
22.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 76-77; Bangladesh, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: WORLD FACTBoOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/geos/bg.html [https://perma.cc/MQZ6-JH6UJ (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
23.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 66; Bangladesh, WORLD FACTBOOK,
supra22.
24.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at iv.
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mismanagement of its waters. A 2012 U.S. Department of State Global
Water Security report analyzed the river basin management capacity
of several large river basins worldwide projected through the year
2040.25 The Brahmaputra was ranked as the most inadequately

26
managed river basin of the seven chosen for the study. The report
listed uncoordinated land use and development plans, reduced water
flows, and saltwater intrusion into the delta as major issues facing the
7
basin.2
Second, experts predict that climate change will severely impact
the Brahmaputra's flow. A 2014 report prepared by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature suggests that climate change will
cause a net increase in the river's flow over the next 50 to 100 years,
due to increased monsoons with greater rainfall, and larger runoff
28
zones from more rapid snow melt. A 2010 Science report concluded
that climate change will severely affect the Brahmaputra basin, "owing
to the large population and the high dependence on irrigated
29
agriculture and melt-water."
Physical concerns aside, a 2016 report released by the CNA found
water security on the river to be subject to gaming methodology that
reveals a lack of trust between the state stakeholders, particularly
regarding regional security dynamics and the management of the river
resources.3 0 Water stress, whether from sudden, increased flows,
compromised water quality, mismanagement, water scarcity, or
gamesmanship, could increase tension in a region where political
relationships are already precarious. The river system is effectively a
live test case for the effects of climate change in the context of
uncooperative state entities presiding over a changing environment.

B. TransboundaryWater Law
Though river basins only account for 3 percent of the planet's
water volume, they provide a disproportionate amount of the water
used by humans.3 1 Nearly one-half of the world's river basins are

ICA 2012-08, Intelligence Community Assessment: Global Water Security,
25.
U.S. OFFICE DIR. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE 5 (Feb. 2012), https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/Special%20ReportICA%20G1obal%20Water%20Security.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SKQ2-TGXH] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
Chandan Mahanta et al., Physical Assessment of the BrahmaputraRiver,
28.
INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN), Dec. 2014, at 64.

Walter W. Immerzeel et al., Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water
29.
Towers, 328 SCIENCE 1382, 1385 (Jun. 11, 2010).
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 6.
30.
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
31.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 338 (4th ed. 2018).
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shared between two or more countries; thus, cooperation is crucial in
order to effectively manage competing interests. 32
International environmental law aimed at protecting freshwater
resources from pollution and overuse have historically developed in an
ad hoc fashion, growing out of individual rivers, lakes, and freshwater
ecosystems.33 As early as 1929, the Permanent Court of International
Justice recognized that the utilization of rivers, including their flow,
was to be subject to international law. 34 International law provides
several avenues for water adjudication, including negotiation, judicial
enforcement proceedings, settlement of disputes by the International
Court of Justice, and arbitration.3 5 Water law has grown to reflect the
belief that water as a resource should be governed by principles of
equity, stewardship, and cooperation. 36
Although created to primarily address navigation, today's
customary international water law reflects the belief that water
resources cannot be used by states in a way that diminishes the
equitable rights of other riparian states that use that shared
resource.3 7 This general principle in international law is often
expressed as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or the obligation to
use one's property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another.3 8
Under international law, the injury threshold with respect to
water rights is crossed when the action creates an "appreciable" harm,
defined as having "a detrimental impact of some consequence upon the
public health, industry, property, agriculture, or the environment of
another state."3 9 Working towards equitable water use can be a hefty
undertaking, given the indispensable role that water resources play in
human life and industry. Since controversies over shared water
resources can easily erupt, management frameworks are often most
effective
when they employ non-judicial,
non-confrontational
approaches. 40

32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 339.
34.
Id.
35.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Env't and Sec. Initiative, Report of the
National Working Group Meeting for Identification of the Legal and InstitutionalNeeds
for Accession and Implementation of the UNECE Water Convention by Georgia 3 (2009)
[hereinafter UNECE].
36.
See generally Declaration on the Industrial and Agricultural Use of the
International Rivers, Adopted by the Seventh Int'l Conference of American States,
Montevideo, 1933, Whiteman; OP 7.50, June 2001, para. 4-7.
37.
SANDS AND PEEL supranote 31, at 340.
38.
Gabriel Eckstein, Applications of International Water Law to
Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slobak-Hungarian Dispute over
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 67, 75 (1995) (discussing that
the principle is recognized as being part of general international law).
39.
Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change:A Study of International
Rivers and Their Legal Arrangements, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 741, 780 (1990).
40.
See remarks made at the U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Env't and Sec.
Initiative, Report of the National Working Group Meeting for Identificationof the Legal
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International treaties have provided frameworks for governing
shared water resources effectively. The 1992 Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes (UNECE Water Convention) is a regional agreement adopted by
members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) to facilitate cooperation between nations in their efforts to
41
protect the quantity, quality, and sustainability of water resources.
The UNECE Water Convention creates a general obligation for
signatories to take appropriate measures to "prevent, control and
reduce pollution of waters causing or likely to cause transboundary
impact"; to ensure the waters are used in an "equitable and reasonable
way," with the aim of "ecologically sound and rational water
management, conservation of water resources and environmental
protection"; and "to ensure conservation, and, where necessary,
restoration of ecosystems." 42 Moreover, all parties to the Convention
are governed by the principle of reciprocity, meaning that states
sharing water basins have equal rights and responsibilities, and that
43
no state can demand from another that which it will not do itself. The

agreement is based on the idea of integrated water resource
management, and is a manifestation of current international views of
shared water rights. 44
In 2013, the UNECE Water Convention was amended to allow
accession by all UN member states, effectively becoming a legal
45
framework for world-wide water cooperation. The UNECE Water
Convention, as well as the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN
Watercourses Convention or UNWC), are models that countries can
use to govern international watercourses. The UNWC is generally
recognized as codifying certain water obligations under customary
international law. 46 These obligations include equitable and

and Institutional Needs for Accession and Implementation of the UNECE Water
Convention by Georgia 3 (2009). For an example of this principle see the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty signed by the United States and Canada, which sought to protect water
levels and navigability on the Great Lakes. It was one of the first treaties to contain
pollution prevention language, stating "boundary waters and waters flowing across the
boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property of the
other." Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
May 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 2448.
41.

Water

Convention,

UNECE,

http://www.unece.org/env/water.html

[https://perma.ccR9ED-WQ67] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
42.
International Lakes, art. 2, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
UNECE, supra note 35.
43.
See generally SANDS AND PEEL, supra note 32, at 338-69.
44.
Water Convention, supra note 42.
45.
46.

Stephen C. McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses

of International Watercourses, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L LAW (May 21, 1997),
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47

prevention of significant
harm, and prior notification of planned measures.49
The two conventions are generally compatible, but they contain a
few key differences. 50 First, the UNECE Water Convention is generally
more detailed and prescriptive than the UNWC. 5 1 For instance, the
UNECE Water Convention requires parties to enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements with each other and establish joint bodies for
closer collaboration in managing the water systems. 52 Furthermore,
the UNECE Water Convention mandates a more robust institutional
framework, calling for a secretariat and frequent meetings between the
parties.5 3 This framework has helped parties assess and strengthen
their water agreements and obligations on an ongoing basis, and it has
been a key part of the Convention's success. 54 These specific provisions
stand in contrast to the UN Watercourses Convention, which only
encourages, rather than mandates, institutional cooperation.55 The
UNECE Water Convention has been in force since 1996, while the
48

http://egal.un.org/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html [https://perma.cc/GLC9-L6FS] (archived
Jan. 21, 2018).
47.
Soon after the passage of the UNWC the International Court of Justice
wrote in its decision Gabcikovo Nagymaros, concerning Slovakia and Hungary's
utilization of the Danube river, '"The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by
unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its
right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube...
failed to respect the proportionality which is required by international law." GabeikovoNagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 85 (Sept. 25); see also Huang, supra
note 21, at 235.
48.
Similarly, the prevention of significant harm was recognized soon after the
implementation of the UNWC by international courts in the Pulp Mills case between
Argentina and Uruguay, writing that a State is "obliged to use all the means at its
disposal to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any other area under
its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State. This
Court has established that this obligation 'is not part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment."' Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J.
14, T 101 (Apr. 20). For a more detailed discussion, see Huang, supra note 21, at 235.
49.
Although prior notification of planned measures has not been adopted by an
international tribunal as of yet, the 2004 International Law Association's Berlin Rules,
which rewrote of the Helsinki Rules concerning international water law, stated that
"customary international law requires that notification be prompt." The Berlin Rules, 71
INT'L L. AsS'N REP. CONF. 337, preface (2004). For a more detailed discussion, again see
Huang, supra note 21, at 235.
50.
User's Guide Fact Sheet Series: Number 12 UN Watercourses Convention
and
UNECE
Water
Convention,
UN
WATERCOURSES
CONVENTION,
http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documentsfUNWC-Fact-Sheet- 12Relationship-with-UINECE-Water-Convention.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NXB-FSCW]
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
51.
Id.
52.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes art. 9, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
53.
Id.
54.
ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION USER'S
GUIDE 39 (1st ed. 2012).
55.
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses art. 8, Aug. 17, 2014, 36 I.L.M. 700.
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UNWC was more recently entered into force in 2014.56 However, the
UNECE Water Convention has only been available to non-UNECE
states since 2016.57 Despite their differences, both treaties develop
freshwater law and general international water law's commitment to
inter-state cooperation.
III. CURRENT WATER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE RIPARIAN STATES
Although there is no multilateral agreement currently in place
with respect to the Brahmaputra, efforts have been made in the past
decades, namely through bilateral agreements and Memorandums of
Understanding (MoUs), to begin developing the riparian states' water
relationships.5 8 These interactions have been primarily focused on
environmental monitoring and the limited sharing of scientific data,
with less emphasis on politically polarizing topics like apportionment
decisions and water rights. This is not to suggest that monitoring and
sharing data are not themselves forms of political action. Both China
and India in particular have viewed their actions with respect to the
Brahmaputra as part of a larger strategy for resource acquisition and
59
political power within the region. The resulting agreements have
therefore been motivated more by self-interest than a genuine
commitment to reach a meaningful and lasting management system.

Status of Treaties: Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
56.
Watercourses and InternationalLakes, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (June 10,
2016, 6:05 EDT), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY&mtdsg
no=XXVII-5&chapter=27&clang-'en [https://perma.cc/37X9-5C5M] (archived Feb. 19,
2018); Status of Treaties: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
InternationalWatercourses, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (June 10, 2016, 7:30
EDT), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXVII12&chapter=27&clang=_en#1 [https://perma.cc/3GR7-GZKM] (archived Feb. 19, 2018).
Bureau of the Meeting of the Parties of the Convention on the Protection
57.
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Annotated
ProvisionalAgenda for the Twenty-Third Meeting, at 1, BUREAUl2016/1 (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2016/wat/04Apr_8_Bureau ofth
[https://perma.cclC4FZ-ZSCQ]
e Convention/Agendabureau-April20l6_final.pdf
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
See Ministry of External Affairs, Memorandum of Understanding between
58.
the Ministry of Water Resources, the Republic of India and the Ministry of Water
Resources, the People's Republic of China on Strengthening Cooperationon Trans-border
Rivers, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/22368/Memorandum+of+Understanding+between+the+Ministry+of
+Water+Resources+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Ministry+f+Water+Resources+t
he+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+Strengthening+Cooperation
[https://perma.cclVJ3W-GZTA] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at iii.
59.
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A. China-IndiaRelationship
Though their relationship has been politically fraught, China and
India 'have sought to find common ground by sharing minimal,
scientific information from each parties' section of the Brahmaputra
river system.60 On a broad level, China has attempted to defuse
tensions over the river by emphasizing the limited impact China's use
of the Brahmaputra has on Indian interests in two key ways. First, by
providing Chinese hydrological data to India during the annual flood
season, China has started to increase cooperation through data sharing
and emergency response. 61 Second, by publicly proclaiming that its
dam-building plans are to be used for electricity-generation only, China
seeks to assuage India's fears of water diversion. To this end, China
has highlighted that these dams are "run of the river," 62 meaning they
will not reduce or stop river flow. 63 This is of great concern to India:
although the country does not rely heavily on the Brahmaputra for
agricultural purposes, it has identified the river as a component in its
larger river linking plan, and is thus concerned about maintaining
sufficient flow. 64 China's reassurances notably refer to the physical
flow of the river rather than the geography through which it flows, as
this land is still a source of conflict.
China's overtures of goodwill towards its southern neighbor have
been recorded in a series of agreements, most notably in MoUs signed
by the two countries. 65 Following a severe flood in India in 2000, the

60.
Id. at 25, 26.
61.
Id.
62.
"Run of the river" facilities channel a portion of the river's waters through a
canal or penstock, sometimes without the use of a dam. See Office of Energy Efficiency
&
Renewable
Energy,
Types
of
Hydropower
Plants,
ENERGY.GOV,
https://energy.gov/eere/water/types-hydropower-plants
[https://perma.cc/3LWD-GAB3]
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
63.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 27.
64.
The river linking plan seeks to increase the country's water security by
diverting water from rivers in the north and west of the country to more drought-ridden
areas in the south and east. The plan would divert water from the Ganges and the
Brahmaputra to rivers in central and west India. See Vidhi Doshi, India Set to Start
Massive Project to Divert Ganges and BrahmaputraRivers, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2017
7:51 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/18/india-set-tostart-massive-project-to-divert-ganges-and-brahmaputra-rivers [https://perma.cc/S52AGNBVJ (archived Jan. 21, 2018); see also Sudha Ramachandran, The Cost of Interlinking
India's Rivers, DIPLOMAT (July 20, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-cost-ofinterlinking-indias-rivers/ [https://perma.cc/3MXQ-55T4] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
65.
See generally Ministry of External Affairs, Memorandum of Understanding
between the Ministry of Water Resources, the Republic of India and the Ministry of Water
Resources, the People's Republic of China on Strengthening Cooperationon Trans-border
Rivers,

GOVERNMENT

OF

INDIA (Oct.

23,

2013),

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-

documents.htm?dtl/22368/Memorandum+of+Understanding+between+the+Ministry+of
+Water+Resources+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Ministry+of+Water+Resources+t
he+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+Strengthening+Cooperation
[https://perma.cc/AUJ8-6CRA] (archived Jan. 21, 2018); Ministry of Water Resources,
River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, India-ChinaCo-Operation,GOVERNMENT OF
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two governments signed an MoU stating that China would provide
hydrological information from three stations from June 1 to October 15
of every year. 66 This MoU was renewed in 2008 and again in 2013.67
China and India also agreed to a new MoU in 2013, which extends the
period of information sharing and also states that the two countries
"recognize[e] that trans-border rivers and related natural resources
and the environment are assets of immense value to the socio-economic
68
the
Furthermore,
of all riparian countries."
development
Memorandum speaks of "enhanc[ing] mutual strategic trust and
communication as well as strengthen[ing] the strategic and
69
India has responded to these goodwill
cooperative partnership."
overtures by adopting a "trust but verify" stance, wherein New Delhi
accepts Chinese statements but nevertheless monitors Chinese
activities, standing ready to communicate any concerns about Beijing's
70
water activities.
China, in turn, is most concerned with India's control over the
Arunachal Pradesh. India has stated openly that current and future
plans for damming in the area are intended not only to control flooding
and increase electricity in the region, but also to assert water usage
71
rights for the area as per international practice. China has expressed
opposition to these plans, primarily through its influence on
international institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, by
72
Cooperation between the
denying India funding for these projects.
two countries is limited due to this ongoing border dispute and mutual
distrust exists between the two states over issues reaching far beyond
water policy. In this political climate, any water treaty involving the
two countries will likely need to continue focusing on shared scientific
data and goals such as disaster management, environmental
protection, and river safety, rather than anything that could implicate
such as equitable apportionment or state
sensitive topics,
73
boundaries.

INDIA (last visited July 6, 2016), http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?1id=349
[https://perma.cc/GG3G-8ZPC] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
Ministry of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation,
66.
India-China Co-Operation, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (last visited July 6, 2016),
(archived
[https://perma.cc/AF34-BKBK]
http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=349
Jan. 21, 2018).
67.
Id.
Ministry of External Affairs, supra note 65.
68.
69.
Id.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 27.
70.
Id. at 28.
71.
Ramachandran, supra note 64.
72.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 31.
73.
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B. India-BangladeshRelationship
The
Indian-Bangladeshi
relationship
concerning
the
Brahmaputra is characterized by overall feelings of goodwill, mainly
as a result of their one successful water management agreement for
the Ganges River. This cooperative atmosphere colors their
interactions regarding the Brahmaputra, however, each side retains
independently cognizable concerns with respect to use of the river. For
India, these concerns are mainly political or deal with larger
nationwide plans for water sharing: only 3 percent of India's population
lives in the Brahmaputra basin, and the area is not largely agricultural
or industrial. 74 In contrast, the physical viability is of utmost
importance to Bangladesh: 70 percent of Bangladesh's population lives
within the basin, which provides 65 percent of country's river water.7 5
The river is only one piece of the larger water relationship
maintained by India and Bangladesh. Of the fifty-seven rivers that
flow through Bangladesh, fifty-four come by way of India. 76 Despite
this abundance of shared rivers, only the Ganges River is subject to a
water-sharing agreement.7 7 Because Bangladesh relies so heavily on
water for its economy, including for the livelihood of so many of its
citizens, it is eager to add another agreement to the list. The
Brahmaputra, as one of Bangladesh's largest rivers, is of particular
import.
Generally, India and Bangladesh manage their river connections
through a Joint Rivers Commission (JRC).78 The JRC began with a
joint declaration from the Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and India in
March 1972 and is based on the goal of equitable and mutual benefit
of their shared waters.7 9 The two countries agreed to conduct a
comprehensive survey of their numerous water interconnections and
set goals to formulate and implement projects addressing flood control,
irrigation, and power grid interconnectedness. 8 0 The JRC has held
thirty-seven meetings since its founding, and has helped maintain
open channels of communication through which each state can outline
its water security goals. Notably, as discussed below, the Ganges River

74.
Id. at 38.
75.
Id. at 66.
76.
Id. at 75.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 63.
79.
Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, Bangl. - India,
Nov. 24, 1972, Joint Rivers Commission Bangladesh, http://www.jrcb.gov.bd/
statute.html [https://perma.cc/CN47-4S9M] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
80.
About Joint Rivers Commission Bangladesh, JOINT RIVERS COMMISSION
BANGLADESH, www.jrcb.gov.bdlaboutjrc.html [https://perma.cc/Z64Z-JKXH] (archived
Jan. 21, 2018).

570

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 51:555

was initially excluded from the JRC's domain, and the question of its
81
apportionment was left exclusively to the states' two prime ministers.
The JRC has been so effective as a means to discuss water
agreements that Bangladesh has established its own "Joint River
Commission, Bangladesh" ("JRC, Bangladesh") to lay out its water
concerns more fully and to interact with other states in the region on a
wider level. 82 Through JRC, Bangladesh the country has coordinated

with China and India on joint projects as a means to discourage
83
These
potentially capricious handling of the Brahmaputra's flow.
efforts are a notable step in the region's slow progress towards
cooperation.
Though Bangladesh maintains a friendly relationship with India,
it has concerns about how India's water projects might affect the
quantity and quality of water that reaches it. India has plans to
develop nationwide water-diversion projects to relieve the country's
84
water scarcity and to aid in irrigation. The Brahmaputra basin fits
into these larger plans.
Bangladesh feels particularly threatened by India's river linking
project, known as the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) program, wherein
India plans to connect rivers within its territory to increase its own
water security. 85 The ILR program gained significant traction
following the Bharatiya Janata Party's entrance into political power in
2014.86 According to India's Ministry of Water Resources, the ILR
program envisions fourteen Himalayan River links and sixteen
Peninsular River links that are intended to increase irrigation
potential from 140 million hectares to 175 million hectares and to
87
The river linkages are
generate 34,000 megawatts of power.
additionally meant to help India with flood control, navigation, water
88
supply, fisheries, salinity, and pollution control.
For the Brahmaputra specifically, India has outlined plans in its
ILR to construct reservoirs on the principal tributaries of the
89
Brahmaputra to link the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. Bangladesh
argues these diversions would reduce water flows in its territory,

81.

JEROME D. PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING

WATER CONFLICTS 185 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
About Joint Rivers Commission Bangladesh, supra note 80.
82.
Id.
83.
See Inter Linking of Rivers, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF WATER
84.
RESOURCES, RIVER DEVELOPMENT & GANGA REJUVENATION (Mar. 02, 2016),

wrmin.nic.in/forms/1ist.aspx?lid=1279 [https://perma.cc/27LR-X7BH] (archived Jan. 21,
2018).
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 76.
85.
Ramachandran, supranote 64.
86.
Inter Linking of Rivers, supra note 84.
87.
Id.
88.
Ramachandran, supra note 64.
89.
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increase water salinity, harm soil otherwise used for agriculture, and
increase desertification of its land.9 0
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Source: Map drawn by Mike Markowitz, CNA, 2016. Composite relying on d-maps,
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Agency, "Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Gonga Link," Mar. 14, 2012, http://indiawris.nrsc.gov.in/wrpinfo/?tite=Monas-Sankosh-Tisto-GangaLink; International Water
Management Institute, "Strategic Analysis of India's National River-Linking Project,"
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Although the ILR would link rivers inside Indian borders for the
sake of India's own water security, the linkages could have a strong
transboundary water impact.9 ' Bangladesh has significant misgivings
about these possible linkages, yet large parts of the project currently

90.
91.

Id.
Inter Linking of Rivers, supra note 84.
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appear unrealistic due to overwhelming political, technical, and
financial hurdles. 92 For this reason, the ILR threat appears more
hypothetical and long-term and is assuaged by other positive aspects
of the countries' water cooperation.
Bangladesh also has concerns stemming from the stalled
implementation of a Teesta River agreement between the two nations.
India and Bangladesh have disputed the apportionment of the Teesta
for decades, but entered into an ad hoc agreement in 1983 that
apportioned 36 percent of the river to Bangladesh and 39 percent to
94
India.9 3 The agreement, however, was never implemented. In a 2010
JRC meeting, the countries set a goal of signing a final agreement by
95
2011, and thus began to exchange draft agreement language. Though
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had hoped final language
would be signed on a visit to Bangladesh in 2011, the agreement was
stymied by the Chief Minister of West Bengal, the Indian state through
which the river flows. The Minister stated her opposition to the draft
agreement, citing the implications it would have on her state's water
accessibility. 9 6 Since India's constitution designates water issues as
state-level matters, her opposition was fatal to the agreement, despite
97
both national governments' support for the project.
Although both countries remain optimistic that the agreement can
overcome the opposition, the problem highlights how difficult it can be
to reach international water agreements with a federal state like India;
the country houses twenty-nine separate states that can all
individually stall or stymie water agreements affecting their
resources.98 Such apportionment agreements will only become trickier
99
in the future, as India is expected to become "water stressed" by 2025

92.
93.

Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 61, 63.
Sundeep Waslekar et al., Rivers of Peace: Restructuring India Bangladesh

Relations, STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GRouP 3 (2013).

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

See id. at 3-4 (noting that the state needed to give its consent to the central
96.
government before it could enter into an agreement with Bangladesh).
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 61.
97.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

WORLD
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and "water scarce"100 by 2050.101 As access to water becomes more
valuable, state politicians will feel more pressure to pursue local
preferences at the expense of national foreign policy objectives,
compounding the difficulty of reaching consensus.
Finally, India and Bangladesh's sole water agreement, which
concerns the Ganges River Basin, is not without its own problems.
Bangladesh (then a part of Pakistan) first approached India about its
use of the Ganges River in 1951, because it was concerned about
reports that India had plans to build a barrage 10 2 on the river.10 The
two nations began expert-level talks in 1960 that lasted until 1968,
during which time India began construction on the Farakka
Barrage.1 04 India eventually acquiesced to Bangladesh's repeated
requests for higher level meetings, and five secretary-level meetings
were held from 1968 through 1970.105

These meetings, all held while the Barrage was being constructed,
illustrated Bangladesh's weakness as the lower riparian state relative
to India's more powerful position as the upper riparian state.
Bangladesh consistently advocated for a "framework for a settlement
for the equitable sharing of the Ganges waters between the two
countries," while India demurred, citing data accuracy and adequacy
concerns.10 6 Whether genuine or not, these excuses successfully stalled
real progress over several years while the Barrage was under
construction.
Eventually, the prime ministers met to discuss the issue in person,
and both released statements publicly acknowledging that the water
supply was inadequate for both Indian diversion and Bangladeshi
needs during periods of minimum flow. 0 7 Agreeing that the situation
was unsustainable, the prime ministers handed the issue to the JRC

&

100.
See id. (defining 'water scarcity' as "where there are insufficient water
resources to satisfy long-term average requirements. It refers to long-term water
imbalances, combining low water availability with a level of water demand exceeding
the supply capacity of the natural systems").
101.
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES, WATER SECURITY FOR
INDIA: THE EXTERNAL DYNAMICS 5 (Institute for Def. Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
2010). Additionally, recent studies have indicated that 30 percent of China's land faces
extremely high water stress, effecting 678 million people, and that Bangladesh is one of
the most vulnerable countries in the world to the impact of climate change. See Jiao
Wang et al., China's Water Stress is on the Rise, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/01/chinas-water-stress-rise [https://perma.cc/42CC-S3MR]
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
102.
Otherwise known as a diversion dam.
103.
Aaron T. Wolf & Joshua T. Newton, Case Study of Transboundary Dispute
Resolution: The Ganges River Controversy, OR. STATE UNIV. COLL. EARTH, OCEAN
ATMOSPHERE SCI., http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case studies/
GangesNew.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cclDZ3E-F9CD] (archived
Jan. 21, 2018).
104.
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105.
Id.
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1 08
to "determin[e] the optimum method of augmenting Ganges flow."
After nine meetings held by the JRC between 1974 and 1976, during
which little was agreed upon beyond the two parties' competing
interests, Bangladesh lodged a formal protest against India with the
United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly adopted a consensus
statement "encouraging the parties to meet at the ministerial level for
negotiations, with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious
settlement." 0 9
In November 1977, spurred by international pressure, the parties
1 10
The Agreement addressed
signed the Ganges Waters Agreement.
apportionment of the Ganges' waters and outlined a long term solution
11
The Agreement was meant
for augmentation of its dry season flows.
to be a short-term solution only, and lapsed in 1982.112 A subsequent
short-term MoU ended in 1988 and was not replaced until the 1996
Ganges River Treaty, which delineated the flow regimes to be
113
This new treaty was based
implemented under varying conditions.
largely upon a 1985 MoU signed by India and Bangladesh, which
addressed how the countries would apportion flow through the 1988
season and established a Joint Committee of Experts to discuss and
14
resolve competing development conflicts.1 There, India expressed its
desire to link the Brahmaputra and the Ganges rivers, while
Bangladesh raised concerns about dams located on the Ganges
1 15
headwaters in Nepal.
Though the 1996 treaty is both useful and necessary, it contains
significant deficiencies. Importantly, the treaty fails to identify an
adequate system for dealing with water shortages. The treaty provides
that if the flow from Farakka Barrage falls below 50,000 cusecs (with
a cusec being defined as equal to one cubic foot of water per second),
several requirements fall into place. First, the Indian and Bangladeshi
governments must meet to determine an appropriate course of action
based upon "principles of equity, fair play, and no harm to either
party." 1 6 Second, until a sharing agreement is reached, India must
release at least 90 percent of Bangladesh's flow at Farakka, based upon
7
a previously agreed upon schedule.11 This arrangement does little to
address other variables that could affect flow conditions, including

108.
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110.
111.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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BANGLADESH (Sept. 17, 2014), http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=GangesWaterSharing [https://perma.cc/5U7Q-AW2Y] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) (noting that the
treaty was only intended to last for five years).
Wolf, supra note 103.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
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other riparian states' use of the Ganges and extreme weather events,
like droughts. Further, it lacks an arbitration clause, giving the parties
no means of enforcing the agreement.1 18 If, for instance, the river's flow
decreases significantly due to climate change, India and Bangladesh
will be unable to withdraw their respective water allocations
concurrently. Disputes have already occurred over inadequate crossboundary flows, and India's river-linking aspirations seem likely to
exacerbate the problems." 9
These problems illustrate the shortcomings of the two states'
water relationship, especially when confronted with continued use of
the water in a changing environment. Of the fifty-four rivers the two
nations share, only one is subject to a treaty, which took over four
decades to create and still remains problematic. While the Ganges
River Accord can be viewed as a successful effort at cooperation and
trust, Bangladesh remains unsatisfied with India's continued water
diversion, the treaty's failure to guarantee flow, and its lack of an
effective mechanism for enforcement.12 0 These issues are of key
concern moving forward in the two states' future water diplomacy and
will be on the agendas of both states as they work towards any future
water agreement. The Ganges River Accord demonstrates that
progress in this arena takes decades of sustained diplomacy, and is
often imperfect.
C. China-BangladeshRelationship
Though China and Bangladesh both have complicated
relationships with India, their own exchanges have been relatively
uncontroversial with regard to the Brahmaputra River. The two states
do not share a border, and therefore their interactions concerning the
well-being of the river are often couched within larger themes of
environmental cooperation and friendly regional relations. China is
one of Bangladesh's largest trading partners and often competes with
India for political influence over Bangladesh.121 In an effort to
counterbalance Indian influence and increase its own goodwill with
Bangladesh, China has shared hydrological data with Bangladesh
while criticizing Indian river diversion plans. Evidence of this
competition is clear: although China shares flood information on the
Brahmaputra with both India and Bangladesh, it only charges India
for the service.1 22

118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
See Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 79 (noting that many parties fault
India for not living up to its treaty obligations).
121.
Bangladesh, OBSERVATORY ECON. COMPLEXITY, http://atlas.media.mit.edul
en/profile/country/bgd/ (last visited at Nov. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7ZXN-MJM4]
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
122.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 83-84.
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Chinese-Bangladeshi interactions concerning the Brahmaputra,
like those between China and India, focus primarily on the sharing of
scientific data and environmental concerns. In 2010, China and
Bangladesh issued a Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of
China and the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Joint Statement), in
which they agreed to "carry out sustainable cooperation on
river
of
control
flood
and
sharing
data
hydrological
Yarluzangbu/Brahmaputra," through "strengthen[ing] cooperation on
water resources management, hydrological data sharing, flood control
and disaster reduction."1 2 3 China additionally "agree[d] to provide
assistance for dredging of riverbeds and for capacity building through
24
training of personnel."1
This statement was updated in March 2015 through an MoU
wherein China agreed to provide additional water flow data from Tibet
to Bangladesh during the monsoon season months, as well as rainfall
25
data, in order to better forecast floods and prevent natural disasters.1
However, although Bangladesh believed that the MoU would go into
effect in June 2015, no action was taken by China at that time to fulfill
its obligations.1 26 Bangladeshi officials largely minimized this late
response, reasoning that the MoU was an "understanding" rather than
an "agreement."' 2 7 This situation underscores the need for formal
agreements between the riparian states, since looser "understandings"
have proven inadequate for creating clear and binding obligations.
Consistent with its position towards India, China has continued
to assure Bangladesh that it has no plans to divert the Brahmaputra's
waters.1 28 This is a source of great concern for Bangladesh, which
would face disaster if both China and India sought to change the
allocation of the river's resources. Despite these assurances,
Bangladesh continues to seek increased transparency about China's
29
long-term goals for the Brahmaputra.1
The China-Bangladesh relationship highlights the relatively
weak position Bangladesh occupies in determining the river's future
management. Although Bangladesh seeks assurances and cooperation
from both of its upper riparian neighbors, India and China are both
loath to specify water allocation amounts that could limit their future
use. Moreover, both China and India exhibit a tendency to use the
river-and their relationship with Bangladesh-as a political tool

123.
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9

-

2 4
2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa-eng/wjdt_665385/ 6
CHINA (March 22,
665393/t674421.shtml [https://perma.cclL5PC-LYX9] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
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against each other, as seen by their unwillingness to enter into
multilateral river talks. Instead, both upper riparian states show a
decided preference for resolving any river issues on an individualized
level. This fragmentation and lack of commitment stymie real efforts
at river cooperation.

IV. EXPANDING THE UNECE WATER CONVENTION
Beginning on March 1, 2016, countries outside of the UNECE
30
region can accede to the UNECE Water Convention.o
As of this
writing, no country outside of the original region has joined the
Convention.' 3
However, projects seeking to promote better
management of shared waters are underway in the Caucasus, Central
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeastern Europe to improve the
management of shared water resources, and several of the
participating countries hope to eventually ratify and implement the
UNECE Water Convention. 132 The UNECE Water Convention
addresses many of the challenges facing the Brahmaputra riparian
states, namely assisting transboundary basins adapt to climate
change, assessing transboundary waters, and identifying the benefits
of transboundary water cooperation. 3 3 Moreover, the Convention's
incremental approach and focus on transparency, reciprocity, and
prevention of significant harm would be well suited to addressing the
challenges facing the river.
A. Benefits of TransboundaryWater Cooperation
Transboundary water cooperation is desirable for countries not
only as a means to decrease conflict with their riparian neighbors, but
also more generally as a way to demonstrate compliance with
customary international law. Benefits arise on both on a regional and
global level when states enter into comprehensive water management
agreements.
Customary international water law includes the principle that
states maintain sovereignty over their natural resources, but that they

130.
Water Convention, supra note 41.
131.
Status of Treaties: Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercoursesand InternationalLakes, supra note 56.
132.
See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, Env't and Sec. Initiative, Report of the
National Working Group Meeting for Identification of the Legal and InstitutionalNeeds
for Accession and Implementation of the UNECE Water Convention by Georgia (2009)
(outlining the importance of the Convention for cooperation on shared waters between
transboundary countries).
133.
See generally Water Convention, supra note 41 (noting that the Convention
provides a framework for facilitating cooperation over water resources).
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34
have a duty to prevent transboundary environmental damage.1
Additionally, customary international law includes the principle of
"good-neighborliness" expressed by the maxim sic utere tuo et alienum
non laedas.13 5 Although customary international water law is still
developing, it holds more than just symbolic importance, having been
referenced in several international water law disputes.
International courts have been increasingly willing to use these
water law principles in international conflict dispute cases. For
instance, in a dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom over
water use under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea wrote in
a Provisional Measures Order that, "the duty to cooperate is a
fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine
environment under Part XII of the Convention and general
international law. . . ."136 Likewise, at the Lac Lanoux Arbitrationheld
between France and Spain, the international court stated, "France [as
the upper riparian state] is entitled to exercise her rights; she cannot
ignore Spanish interests. Spain [the lower riparian state] is entitled to
demand that her rights be respected and that her interests be taken
into consideration."1 3 7 These cases should serve as cautionary tales to
the Brahmaputra states, particularly to the upper riparian states,
because they demonstrate that courts and tribunals are willing to
incorporate these principles into their decisions. Such language should
spur China and India to solve this management problem on their own
terms, rather than letting the issue go before an international court.
By utilizing the UNECE Water Convention, the Brahmaputra
states would signal their intent to comply with international law. At a
regional level, this would be the rational next step for a waterway that
has seen decades of stalled and fractured water negotiations. A river
basin like the Brahmaputra, filled with geopolitical tensions, fractious
regional goals, and impending natural stressors, presents daunting
challenges from an international cooperation standpoint. International
tribunals are willing to use customary international water law as bases
for their decisions in transboundary water disputes; the Brahmaputra

See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declarationon
134.
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, principle 2 (Aug. 12, 1992);
Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 (June 16, 1972).
See SANDS AND PEEL, supra note 31, at 213 ('The principle of 'good135.
neighbourliness' enunciated in Article 74 of the UN Charter.").
Although UNCLOS specifically addresses laws applicable to the sea, the
136.
tribunal's language underscores the more general and fundamental duty to cooperate
and prevent pollution under international water law. InternationalTribunalfor the Law
of the Sea: The Mox Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Provisional Measures Order of
Dec. 3, 2001, para. 83.
Spain v. France, 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Nov. 16, 1957).
137.
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states would be better off by incorporating these principles on their
own terms through the use of a multilateral agreement.
B. Lessons from the BrahmaputraBasin
Currently, no comprehensive water agreement exists between the
three Brahmaputra states. While all three countries have entered into
various bilateral agreements and/or MoUs with each other, no
multilateral agreement has materialized. There are several lessons
that can be gleaned from the management history of the Brahmaputra
Basin.
First, bilateral cooperation, although rightly celebrated as a form
of progress, is limited in its potential to ensure lasting, comprehensive,
and effective management of the river's resources. Given the
Brahmaputra's uncertain future, disjointed and out-of-date allocation
arrangements that fail to consider the river's changing capabilities will
only exacerbate the entire region's water worries. Moreover, bilateral
talks have consistently favored the upper riparian states, leaving those
downriver at a distinct disadvantage.13 8 This is further exacerbated by
the gamesmanship that has historically transpired in the region
generally, and with respect to the Brahmaputra as a shared waterway
specifically. This is exemplified by: (1) China and India's repeated
rebuttals of Bangladeshi requests for hard water allocation numbers;
(2) India's reticence when negotiating the Ganges River Agreement;
and (3) China's slow implementation of certain MoUs with Bangladesh.
Unequal bargaining power resulting from geography can be mitigated
in a multilateral setting, where competing interests and vulnerabilities
help to even the playing field.
Second, international pressure can motivate progress where
nation-states reach an impasse.13 9 Historically, this was illustrated
when the United Nations General Assembly stepped in to provide the
final push to complete the Ganges Waters Agreement between India
and Bangladesh, effectively breaking India's stranglehold on the
process. 140 International encouragement and attention provides a
neutral voice in the process and creates pressure for progress.
Third, short-term agreements have limited utility unless they are
accompanied
by
commitments
towards
more
permanent
arrangements.141 These agreements should be seen more as stop-gap
measures rather than lasting solutions that allow parties to walk away
from the bargaining table. For example, progress toward a final
agreement slowed after the Ganges River Agreement between India
and Bangladesh was signed in 1977. This resulted in an eight-year

138.
139.
140.
141.

Wolf, supranote 103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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period, between 1988 and 1996, where no agreement governed the
river, leaving Bangladesh with effectively no control over its upper
riparian neighbor's use of the waterway.
In a similar vein, "understandings," as opposed to "agreements,"
should be seen only as a step towards more integrated management
frameworks rather than as long-term solutions. As the 2015 ChineseBangladeshi MoU demonstrates, these understandings do not provide
the level of certainty needed to provide lasting commitments between
the countries. In short, the Brahmaputra countries should implement
an overarching framework, complete with multi-step progress points
leading to a final goal, to set the tone for future negotiations.
Discordant or disconnected arrangements provide only temporary
relief to these persistent and complex issues.
Finally, cooperation should initially focus on environmental
protection and technology-sharing capabilities, as opposed to more
contentious issues like land boundaries. The Brahmaputra runs
through contested land between China and India, and this area is only
one of several border disputes currently at issue between the two
states. 142 Any water treaty negotiations would be doomed from the
outset if the countries were forced to deal with the most contentious
political issues first. In contrast, all three states have recognized the
role climate change will play in destabilizing the river in the future,
and all have historically been willing to share hydrological
information. Focusing on these points of agreement and mutual
concern at the beginning of negotiations will set a collaborative tone
and make future success more likely.
C. Applying the UNECE Water Convention to the Brahmaputra
The Brahmaputra riparian states are currently not party to any
water convention, including the UNECE Water Convention or the
UNWC. 14 3 Moreover, there are no multilateral treaties or
organizational bodies governing the Brahmaputra waters, unlike the
other major river basins of the world. 144 The opening of the UNECE

See, e.g., Chris Buckley and Ellen Barry, China Tells India That it Won't
142.
2017),
4,
(Aug.
TIMES
N.Y.
Dispute,
Border
in
Down
Back
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/worldlasia/china-india-border-tensions.html
[https://perma.cc/3FZS-6NM3] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) (noting that tensions were high,
and that China would not permit anybody to split off any piece of Chinese territory).
Status of Treaties: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
143.
International Watercourses, supra note 56; Status of Treaties: Convention on the
Protectionand Use of TransboundaryWatercourses and InternationalLakes, supra note
56.
See generally The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, Sept. 30, 2012
144.
(discussing the ACTO organization comprised of eight countries from the Amazon Basin);
Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, May 2010, (concerning
activities on the Nile River); Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and
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Water Convention to accession by outside countries provides an
opportunity for the Brahmaputra states to remedy this management
vacuum and to form a cooperative framework in order to better manage
the river's resources.
The UNECE Water Convention should be considered for use on
the Brahmaputra basin, due to its emphasis on bilateral and
multilateral agreements and regular meeting of the parties, its focus
on technical and environmental concerns, and its principles of
reciprocity and transparency. 145 The UNECE Water Convention
contains three sections. Part I, entitled Provisions Relating to All
Parties, discusses general provisions and elaborates on the
environmental goals of the Convention, including prevention,
monitoring, and research and development.1 46 Part II focuses on the
relationship between the riparian parties.14 7 The Convention
encourages increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation, whether
through agreements, joint monitoring, or exchanges of information. 14 8
Finally, Part III contains institutional and other miscellaneous
provisions. 149 This part includes the schedule for future meetings and
details for arbitration of disputes. 50 Each section highlights the
Convention's three main goals: environmental stewardship, increased
cooperation, and continual communication in established forums.
The UNECE Convention and its supporting bodies provide
information and support towards furthering the goals of the
Convention.' 5 ' Convention bodies and guidance documents are
available to states interested in eventual ratification, and provide
incremental steps towards cooperation. 5 2 Furthermore, should the
Brahmaputra riparian states choose to begin this process, they may
model their efforts on those taken in other regions of the world that
have decided to utilize the Convention.
Countries interested in acceding to the UNECE Convention work
with the Implementation Committee, a body of nine members that
facilitates and promotes the implementation and application of the
UNECE Water Convention.15 3 The decision that created the

Sustainable Use of the River Danube, June 29, 1994 (governing activities on the Danube
River).
145.
See generally Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, supra note 42 (emphasizing the need for
strengthened national and international measures to protect the waters in some areas).
146.
Id. at Part I.
147.
Id. at Part II.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at Part III.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
See generally Water Convention, supra note 41 (explaining that the
instrument is available to all UN Member States).
153.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ECE/MP.WAT/37/Add.2
(Rome, Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/meetings/
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Committee describes its purpose as providing a "simple, nonand
supportive
transparent,
non-adversarial,
confrontational,
implementation,
meant to facilitate
mechanism
cooperative"
154
application, and compliance with the Convention.
The Convention also offers guidance documents to assist
interested states, providing tools to begin the process of trust building,
information sharing, and goal setting. The Brahmaputra states have
arguably already started these measures, chiefly through sharing
hydrological data, but could further explore the benefits of cooperation
within the Convention framework.
Notably, the UNECE Water Convention does not replace existing
bilateral and multilateral agreements, nor do states enter into a
boilerplate water sharing agreement by ratifying the Convention:
ratification merely signifies a common agreement that further
multilateral and bilateral agreements in accord with the Convention's
goals, along with joint monitoring bodies and regular meetings of the
55
Article 2 states, "The
parties, need to be established and developed.'
Riparian Parties shall cooperate on the basis of equality and
in particular through bilateral and multilateral
reciprocity,
agreements, in order to develop harmonized policies, programmes, and
strategies . . . ."156 This open language thus allows the Brahmaputra
states to develop their own cooperation frameworks, instead of signing
on to an ill-fitting arrangement.
The Brahmaputra states have already signaled a willingness to
engage in multilateral cooperation. In January 2010, twenty-five water
experts from Bangladesh, China, India, and Nepal gathered for the
Sub-Regional
Workshop on Himalayan
Second International
1 57
The conference was part of a longCooperation for Water Security.
term process meant to build trust and cooperation between the
58
In a statement
riparian states of the Himalayan River Basin.1
entitled The Dhaka Declaration on Water Security, the group
''recommended the formation of an experts committee to prepare a road
map for data sharing and scientific exchange and to prepare guidelines
for introducing transparency regarding relevant data," and "suggested
the establishment of joint research projects involving all the countries

ImplementationCommittee/1st-meeting/Documents/decisionVI-1_Eng.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/37U4-67JR] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
Id.
154.
See Water Convention, supra note 41 (noting that the Water Convention
155.
aims to protect and ensure the quantity, quality, and sustainable use of transboundary
water resources).

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
156.
International Lakes, supra note. 42, at Part I art. II.
Second International Workshop Himalayan Sub-Regional Cooperation on
157.
Water Security, Dhaka Declaration on Water Security (Jan. 16, 2010),
http://www.strategicforesight.com/publicationpdf/20334Dhaka%2Declaration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AFA9-R5RF] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
158.
Id.

2018]

WATER MANAGEMENT ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA

583

represented.""s9
The group
also "acknowledged
the serious
consequences of climate change for water security across the Basin
countries and encouraged concerted collective action in addressing
these."1 60 Former ministers of Water Resources of India, Bangladesh,
and Nepal were among the water experts present. 161
This high-level meeting was a significant diplomatic step, given
the fragmented past interactions between the states. The group
emphasized the desirability of cooperation, equal interests, and the
formation of multilateral committees. 162 Further benefit assessment
exercises could be initiated during a third such meeting of this group,
or on a bilateral level by Bangladesh through the JRC, Bangladesh,
which currently holds meetings with China and India to discuss
various water concerns. 163 These fora can provide stepping stones
towards increased water cooperation and could be settings to discuss
future multilateral agreements required by the Convention.
The Brahmaputra states would additionally benefit from ratifying
the UNECE Water Convention because the Convention would ensure
consistent and continuous party contact. Article 7 of the Convention
demands that an "ordinary meeting shall be held every three years, or
at shorter intervals as laid down in the rules of procedure."1 64 Meetings
under the Convention would focus on reviewing the policies and
methodologies used for transboundary water protection, exchanging
information, utilizing the UNECE and other international bodies to
help adhere to the Convention, and setting up rules of procedure for
future meetings.1 65 Frequent meetings focused on recurring themes
can assist riparian states in continued and improved transboundary
protections.
The Brahmaputra states have historically struggled with setting
consistent meetings to discuss shared water resources. Although
numerous meetings have been held with regard to currently existing
MoUs and other agreements, the states have struggled to sustain
momentum and follow through on the goals of the initiating document.
For instance, after India and Bangladesh signed a short-term Ganges
water sharing agreement, it took nineteen years for them to sign a
long-term treaty.1 66 In the interim, there were no consistent meetings
and India drew strong protest from Bangladesh for overdrawing from

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
See id. (in total, 25 distinguished water experts were present during the
process).
Id.
162.
163.
About Joint Rivers Commission Bangladesh, supra note 80.
164.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, supranote. 42, art. XVII.
165.
Id.
166.
See Ganges Water Sharing, supra note 112 (noting that the long-term treaty
was set to last for 30 years).
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the river.i 6 7 As climate change adds new stressors to the water security
of these states, consistent and continued dialogue will be critical for
resolving disagreements as they arise. Adherence to Convention's
mandated meetings could help the states ensure that dialogue is not
cut off.
The UNECE Water Convention also contains a framework for
settling disputes, which could provide a useful avenue for the parties
to constructively discuss and manage active or imminent conflicts.
Article 22 states that disputes shall "seek a solution by negotiation" or
any other acceptable means to the parties, but that unresolved
disputes will be sent to either the International Court of Justice or
arbitration.1 68 The Convention thus allows the states to settle conflicts
between themselves, or risk going before an international court that
would likely adhere to the principles of customary international water
law. Bangladesh would benefit from this in particular: as the lower
riparian state, it has often been unable to respond effectively when
either China or India has used the river for its own purposes. Moreover,
one of Bangladesh's biggest complaints about the Ganges River Treaty
is that it lacks an arbitration clause. For China and India, an internal
settlement framework would allow them to address management
problems in the first instance, an outcome they would prefer rather
than immediate international interference or condemnation. As the
region's water landscape changes in the coming decades, having a set
dispute framework will provide stability and assurance to the riparian
states.
The Convention does not address water apportionment concerns,
an area of discussion currently off the table between China, India, and
Bangladesh. While water apportionment would be addressed in an
eventual, ideal scenario, the Convention's incremental approach would
first build consensus in politically feasible areas. For instance, initial
progress could be made through the Convention's focus on
environmental protection, minimized transboundary impacts, and
increased data sharing.1 69 Article 2 of the Convention lays out general
provisions that include goals to "prevent, control and reduce pollution
of waters," and to "ensure that transboundary waters are used with the
aim of ecologically sound and rational water management,
0
conservation of water resources and environmental protection."17 The
Convention envisions these goals being met through multilateral
mechanisms like "joint monitoring programs concerning water quality
and quantity" and "cooperation in scientific research programs."17

Id.
167.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
168.
International Lakes, supra note. 42, art. XXII.
Id. at Part I.
169.
Id. at Part II.
170.
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An expanded environmental monitoring program could be a
significant step toward closer collaboration and greater transparency.
There is a significant lack of trust between the three states, which have
a history of political maneuvering and gamesmanship with regard to
water allocation. 172 Establishing a joint monitoring body would quell
worries from lower riparian states about the river's flow and increase
transparency. This would be especially enticing to Bangladesh, which
has sought multilateral cooperation on the river's physical upkeep for
years.17 3 It would also be an appropriate expansion of China's decision
to share hydrological data, reaffirming China's belief that it is using
the river in a low-impact way.1 74 Expanding scientific information
sharing would be a feasible and effective first step toward increasing
goodwill and trust between the three states. Using pre-existing bodies
such as the JRC, Bangladesh could eliminate the need for an entirely
new regulatory body and simultaneously strengthen existing
cooperative frameworks.
The Brahmaputra riparian states are beginning to acknowledge
the importance of each other's water security. China has sought to
assure India of its dams' minimum impact on the river, and
Bangladesh has had several rounds of meetings with India to address
a potential Teesta River Agreement, and thus assure itself of a steady
water supply.1 75 Furthermore, because the Brahmaputra states have
signaled a willingness to share water data, additional environmental
monitoring programs could be a key area of collaborative expansion. 176
As mentioned previously, China shares flood data with both India and
Bangladesh primarily as a flood prevention measure. 177 This
arrangement could be expanded into a permanent body of hydrological
sharing.
Moreover, the politics of the region point to environmental
monitoring as a good first step: maintaining a healthy river system is
of great concern for Bangladesh, the riparian state that has the
healthiest relationship with both China and India. As such, working
on environmental monitoring may be one of the most politically
feasible actions that these nations can undertake as a collective
riparian body, as both China and India have worked hard to exert
influence and maintain goodwill with their southernmost neighbor.

172.
See Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 5-6 (noting that cooperation
between these countries would serve as an adaptation measure in response to climate
change).
173.
See id. at v (explaining that Bangladesh has been the strongest advocate for
basin-wide management).
174.
See id. at 27 (discussing China's failed attempts at quelling Indian
concerns).
175.
Id. at 3.
176.
Id. at 25-26, 83-84.
177.
Id. at 25-26, 83-84.
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Increased joint environmental monitoring will also be beneficial
for confronting climate change. The Convention provides advice in
guidance documents for dealing with issues within the context of
climate change, and advocates an integrated water resource
178
In
management approach to address evolving environments.
particular, the document offers guidance on how to monitor and assess
changes in water quantity and quality; how to evaluate risks and
vulnerabilities as they arise; and how to design, jointly finance, and
79
Following the steps
implement adequate adaptation strategies.'
described in the guidance documents would help further implement the
Convention's provisions and increase transparency, cooperation, and
information sharing.
The Brahmaputra states have already recognized the impending
threat of climate change. The Dhaka Declaration on Water Security
acknowledged the serious consequences that climate change could
have on the region's water sources, and the final document encouraged
80
The UNECE's multi"concerted collective action" to confront it.o
faceted approach could be a valuable tool to begin this process.
Finally, the Convention encourages increased transparency
through alert systems. Article 9 of the Convention envisions the
establishment of joint bodies that, among other tasks, would "establish
warning and alarm procedures."1 8 The Convention also establishes in
Article 14 a warning and alarm system to deal with "any critical
situations that could have a transboundary impact." 82 Such a system,
for instance, could help warn of any sudden flooding. This could help
to avert disasters such as the 2000 flood which swept through India
83
and spurred the initial data sharing between China and India.'
Ratifying the UNECE Water Convention would bring all three
parties to the table to discuss proper management of the river in a
manner that would allow for potential international input. Although
China and India have historically preferred to negotiate on an
individual basis, they have recently begun to work in a more
multilateral way; their participation in the meeting on the Dhaka
Declaration on Water Security is one example. Demonstrating an
intent to ratify the UNECE Water Convention would additionally
indicate a willingness to stop using the river as a political tool and

See generally U.N. Econ, Comm'n for Europe, Guidance on Water and
178.
Adaptation to Climate Change, ECE/MP.WAT/30 (Oct. 2015), http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/Guidance-waterclimate.pdf
[https://perma.ccX8WK-7LSZ] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (noting that experience with
climate change adaptation in the transboundary context is very limited).
179.
Id.
Id.
180.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
181.
International Lakes, supra note 42, art. IV.
Id. art. XIV.
182.
Ministry of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation,
183.
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instead approach the river's problems in a holistic way with input from
all parties. Furthermore, international pressure could help move the
agreement along, something that was critical for India and Bangladesh
to reach an agreement on the Ganges River.
By signaling an intent to join the UNECE Water Convention and
following its guidance documents, the Brahmaputra riparian states
can open new channels of communication. The Convention's approach,
which focuses on issues like environmental monitoring and the benefits
of cooperation, would be well-suited for the Brahmaputra. While the
states have yet to acknowledge certain issues, they are increasingly
willing to discuss the river's physical well-being and collaborate to
ensure the waters remain productive. The Convention's focus on nonpolitical issues would allow the riparian states to produce early
consensus and establish working relationships before moving on to
more contentious issues.
D. Addressing RiparianState Concerns
The UNECE Water Convention is based on the ideals of equality
and reciprocity. 184 These themes also permeate the UNWC, which
China voted against and India abstained from voting on in 1997.185
China voted against the 1997 UNWC because it alleged the treaty did
not reflect the principle of territorial sovereignty, which grants states
"indisputable" sovereignty over the water that flows through their
territories. It also maintained that the UNWC created an imbalance
between the rights and obligations of upstream and downstream
riparian states. 86 Further, China asserted that the Convention did not
reflect general agreement among all states and it disagreed with the
mandatory settlement of any disputes. 8 7
India's concerns, reflected in its abstention statements, included
its belief that the Convention deviated from "general principles."
Specifically, India was concerned that the Convention did not provide
for state autonomy in reaching international water agreements
without being "fettered" by the Convention.' 8 8 It is clear that in 1997,
when these comments were made, neither country was willing to enter
into what they viewed as an overly restrictive agreement. Although the
UNWC recently came into force, neither China nor India is legally
bound to follow its language, as neither has ratified it.
Presented with the opportunity to enter into a different
international water agreement several decades later, these states can

184.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, supra note. 42, art. II.
185.
Press Release, General Assembly, Convention on International
Watercourses, U.N. Press Release GA/9248 (May 21, 1997).
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
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overcome their reservations. First, customary international water law
has further developed since 1997, and China and India's actions have
increasingly fallen into line with its principles. The UNWC and the
UNECE Convention codify international water law's principles of
cooperation, reciprocity, and pollution prevention. International
tribunals are increasingly willing to rely on these criterions when
1 89
Although China and India
looking at transboundary water impacts.
failed to ratify the UNWC, they have begun to acknowledge the current
reality of customary international law principles and have taken more
equitable stances towards their riparian neighbors. For instance,
China has been increasingly respectful of Indian and Bangladeshi
concerns with respect to its actions on the Brahmaputra, and has made
190
Moreover, India
efforts at being more transparent and cooperative.
has signaled a willingness on the state-level to create more water
management agreements with Bangladesh. These actions can be
interpreted as a pivot away from their "indisputable" sovereignty
language from 1997.191

Moreover, India's national government has encountered
roadblocks in recent years as a result of internal politics, with
individual states holding the larger country hostage in international
water agreement talks, as seen with the stalled Teesta River
Agreement.' 9 2 India's previous concerns about an international water
agreement encroaching on its autonomy might change upon reflection,
as it seeks to overcome stonewalling by its own states.
In summary, the UNECE Water Agreement could be attractive to
China as a tool to alleviate lower riparian fears while providing India
with a counter-balance to its internal state influences. Moreover, all
three states have begun dialogues recognizing that climate change
threatens their waterways and have signaled they are willing to
93
increase cooperation on an international level.s The Agreement's
general language and relatively non-inflammatory subject matter only
strengthen its appeal.

See, e.g., The Mox Plant Case, supra note 136.
189.
See generally Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and
190.
the People's Republic of Bangladesh, supra note 123 (noting that the leaders of China
and Bangladesh agreed to share data about flood control on the Brahmaputra);
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 25-26.
Press Release, General Assembly, supra note 185.
191.
Samaranayake et al., supra note 2, at 61.
192.
See Second International Workshop Himalayan Sub-Regional Cooperation
193.
on Water Security, supra note 157 (providing for cooperation between India, China, and
Bangladesh as it relates to water security in the Himalayan River Basin).
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V. CONCLUSION

The time is right for the Brahmaputra riparian states to begin
cooperating on a multilateral scale. A multi-party agreement outlining
the future use and safekeeping of the river's waters is increasingly
necessary, yet will only become more difficult to achieve. Current
pressures and future stressors could soon create an environment no
longer hospitable to the cooperation and compromise necessary to
reach a stable arrangement. The benefits of having an effective
management plan in place to confront climate change and its impacts
on the river will far outweigh the costs of current negotiation and
compromise. Although the Brahmaputra's history has been one of
gamesmanship, bilateral negotiations, and stalled management
agreements, the riparian states have begun to acknowledge the need
for change and thus have begun to pivot towards more multilateral
cooperation. The UNECE Water Convention provides useful tools and
guidance to further this process. The Convention's focus on
incremental steps and regular communication, information sharing
and environmental monitoring, and principles of reciprocity all
comport with international water law and fit well within the existing
relationships of the Brahmaputra states.
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